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Problem area 
A time-based operation, as planned 
in the ATM future, is assumed to 
affect the controllers’ Situation 
Awareness (SA) due to a higher 
priority of meeting a time objective 
and increasing automation. This 
paper provides SA requirements on 
the design of controller support 
tools in time-based operations, 
based on a short literature review 
and an empirical study executed at 
Air Traffic Control the Netherlands 
(LVNL).  
LVNL´s future ATM system 
requires an improved punctuality at 
the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) to 
enable Continuous Descent 
Approaches (CDAs) in the Schiphol 
TMA. 
 
Description of work 
A ground-based Speed and Route 
Advisor (SARA) tool has been 
designed to help Area Control 
(ACC) controllers with achieving a 
higher punctuality. A future follow-
up for SARA could be an air-
ground agreed Controlled Time of 
Arrival (CTA). 
 
Results and conclusions 
The SARA real-time experiment 
results showed that this tool 
definitely decreases the controllers’ 
workload (R/T load, inputs), while 
the target of a higher accuracy at 
IAF was met. The findings have 
also pointed at two major impacts 
on the controllers’ SA as expected 
from the literature. First, controllers 
are currently more focusing on 
distance than on time in forming a 
mental picture of the traffic 
situation. This changes their 
working strategies in sequencing 
traffic and solving conflicts. 
Second, increasing automation (cf. 
SARA advisories) could be in 
conflict with the controllers’ own 
plan of traffic handling. They could 
loose a certain ‘feeling of control’ 
and ultimately their SA. This refers 
to the ‘out-of-the-loop’ problem of 
automation. However, there was a 
strong learning effect already after a 
few experimental sessions. This 
suggests that a gradual 
implementation and training will 
certainly help supporting a smooth 
introduction. Moreover, the impact 
on SA appears to depend on the 
specific design (e.g. Human 
Machine Interface (HMI), 
separation responsibility, quality of 
advisories). 
 
Applicability 
The resulting set of SA 
requirements on the design of such 
controller support tools shall be 
addressed in future developments of 
time-based operations in ATM. 
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1 Introduction  
Future air traffic management (ATM) systems are expected to migrate towards trajectory-based 
operations as proposed in the Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) and NextGen 
concepts. The target is a planned operation mutually agreed between stakeholders such as 
airlines, Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) and airports. Trajectory-based operations 
implicitly include extra focus on the dimension of time. An operation that requires meeting a 3D 
waypoint at a specific time calls for a different approach to handling traffic with increasing 
automation. Today, air traffic controllers use tactical speed, route, altitude and vector 
instructions, based on a first-come-first serve principle. The inclusion of time may have a large 
impact on the controller’s Situation Awareness (SA) because of the focus on time instead of on 
distance. Previous research has shown that increasing automation of ATM systems could 
decrease controllers’ SA, due to vigilance decrements, availability of information and other 
factors [1] [2]. These human factor impacts must be addressed and evaluated when designing 
new ATM systems and support tools, especially in areas characterized by great complexity and 
high-density such as Schiphol Airport.  
This paper explores how the controllers’ SA is affected by time-based operations. It emphasizes 
the reduction of task complexity and creates a basis for a gradual implementation. First, a short 
literature review on SA in ATM is provided. Second, two operational concepts of time-based 
operations addressed at LVNL are explained. This involves the Speed and Route Advisor 
(SARA) tool and the concept of Controlled Time of Arrival (CTA). Third, some empirical 
results of real-time simulations (RTS) with SARA are presented. Finally, a set of SA 
requirements on the design of controller support tools in future time-based operations in ATM 
are derived from the findings in the literature and from the preliminary results of the SARA 
experiment. 
 
 
2 Situation awareness in ATM 
2.1 Situation awareness 
A common assumption is that operators in dynamic and complex tasks such as ATC create a 
mental representation of the changing environment, which makes it possible to keep the relevant 
but transient information in working memory [3]. Pattern recognition plays a central role; the 
controller groups aircraft in a certain way to memorize their positions. These patterns help them 
to order a seemingly chaos by streaming traffic flows. Much research has been done on how 
controllers develop the three-dimensional ‘mental picture’ of the traffic situation. This is usually 
referred to as situation assessment, defined as follows:  ‘The perception of the elements in the 
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environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the 
projection of their status in the near future’ [4]. Situation awareness (SA) is considered the 
product of the process situation assessment that takes place at three levels: perception (SA1), 
interpretation (SA2) and anticipation (SA3). Attention management strategies are crucial to 
keep this ever changing ‘picture’ up-to-date [5]. Controllers continuously apply strategies, 
which are individually different, to keep safety (conflict detection), efficiency (traffic delay) and 
their own mental workload (‘personal efficiency’) in optimal balance [6]. SA is needed to 
identify and enact the most safe and efficient solution to solve specific (conflict) situations. In 
addition, controllers keep their own mental workload under control by adjusting their strategies 
towards less effortful if needed. This is called workload management. If possible, they revert to 
routine actions, standard procedures and ‘simple’ solutions that need less attention and that gain 
time, for instance, by a lower load of radiotelephony. Depending on the evolving situation 
(routine – non-routine), they switch between low and high workload (cf. vigilance). 
 
2.2 The competence SA in ATM 
Internally, LVNL is coping with a shortage of controllers, which is not uncommon at many busy 
and complex ATC units. Due to the complex cognitive nature of the ATC task only a small 
number of people is able to acquire the required competences within a reasonable period of 
training [7]. LVNL is trying to solve this problem by improving selection and training, and also 
by designing new ATM systems that reduce task complexity. As a starting point, a competence 
analysis was performed at LVNL based on literature research and workshops with controllers. 
This has resulted in the ATC Performance Model [8] [9], see Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. The ATC Performance Model [8] [9] 
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The model shows the importance of cognitive processes in which situation assessment plays a 
central role. Information processing guides the actions and this results in safe and efficient 
traffic handling. One important influencing factor is workload management. Research on 
training performance of all trainees between 2003 and 2006, based on this model, has shown 
that ineffective SA and workload management are the two most important reasons for failing 
[9]. This suggests that these competences are more difficult to develop than others and require 
extra attention in designing less complex ATM systems. Within this context, setting human 
requirements on SA and workload management serve as an input in the design of ATM systems 
at LVNL. In addition, the impact on SA, workload management, and other competences, as part 
of the model, is systematically assessed. This is done for each change, by a paper study and by 
measuring them in real-time simulation (RTS) experiments. 
 
2.3 Automation effects on SA 
Previous research has shown that increasing automation as expected in future ATM systems 
could reduce task complexity, and could have an effect on SA in various ways. A possible risk 
of more automation is often referred to as the ‘out-of-the-loop’ performance problem [1]. In 
case of automation failures system operators may have diminished the ability to perform tasks 
manually, due to reduced awareness of the status and processes of the system (SA). There are 
three reasons why this happens. First, monitoring tasks may lead to vigilance problems. 
Alertness decreases and controllers usually have much trust in the equipment. Second, passive 
information processing seems to be inferior to active information processing when detecting the 
need for manual intervention and reorientation to the state of the system. Third, people are 
really out of the loop without any feedback, and they cannot assess the effectiveness of their 
requests and actions. On the other hand, more automation can also mitigate a reduction in SA 
[1]. In a more monitoring role, controllers are better able to spread their attention, especially 
when the system provides superior, integrated information to the controllers. In addition, a 
reduction in SA may be mitigated  by a strong reduction of workload. A partial automation 
strategy should keep the negative and positive effects in balance. It is usually argued that routine 
tasks should be fully automated to reduce workload, while automation should support SA by 
offering better and more integrated information to the controllers. 
These issues have been addressed in research on ATM system design [2], and are mentioned by 
SESAR [10] and NextGen [11]. ATM is also moving towards more monitoring (cf. ‘supervisory 
control’).  Human-centred design in ATM suggests that routine tasks such as radiotelephony 
should be automated (cf. datalink), that information should better be displayed to controllers for 
supporting SA, and that decision support tools are needed to choose the right solutions. 
However, ATM system designers are still searching for the right balance in automation, also in 
relation to fallback systems (machine or human) [10]. Clear and more detailed guidelines for 
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human-centred ATM design are not available yet. Often, new ATM technologies are the starting 
point from which consequences for the human role are derived, while human requirements 
should drive the design as well.  
 
 
3 ATM strategy of LVNL 
3.1 Automation drivers  
Concepts of new ATM systems include various requirements to increase the level of 
automation. For LVNL, many of these requirements have been imposed by the market, and 
national- and European legislation. The home carrier and other airlines are requiring an ever 
improving cost-effectiveness, punctuality and capacity, the government is demanding a safe and 
noise friendly operation and the European Union is enforcing the SESAR concept [10]. These 
requirements cannot be met with the current level of automation. Part of the LVNL strategic 
development is to improve the predictability and accuracy of arrival traffic for Amsterdam 
Airport Schiphol [12]. It is the largest airport in the Netherlands, handling about 430.000 flights 
per year.  
In addition, expedited by the existing shortage on controllers, reduction of work complexity has 
become a central principle in the LVNL strategy. This implies that more candidates would be 
able to become a competent controller and that the transition to new ATM systems for current 
operational personnel would be sufficiently easy. More automation can help with making the 
task easier for controllers. 
 
3.2 ATM strategy  
Based on these automation drivers, LVNL has developed an ATM strategy that meets these 
requirements. An important enabler is the introduction of CDAs for arriving aircraft. To achieve 
this, LVNL will first need to develop new procedures and systems to improve its Arrival 
Management (AMAN) process, called inbound planning. These procedures include an improved 
planning on predefined arrival routes, based on Precision Area Navigation (P-RNAV) and better 
weather information in the Terminal Area (TMA). The use of tactical vectoring will reduce if 
system support improves the execution of the inbound planning. For controllers, it will be more 
difficult to tactically adjust the arrival flow in order to maximise runway throughput. The arrival 
flow will need to be fixed and optimized at an earlier stage, which could lead to a reduced 
runway throughput. However, LVNL studies on P-RNAV routes and procedures in the Schiphol 
TMA indicate that this can be mitigated by a more accurate traffic delivery at the IAF. If aircraft 
arrive within an accuracy of less than plus or minus 30 seconds of their expected approach time 
(EAT) at IAF instead of plus or minus 120 seconds being required nowadays, controllers will be 
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able to maintain a runway throughput of approximately 35 aircraft per runway (per hour). 
Experiments have been conducted using accurate traffic samples of realistic operations.  
In conclusion, developing an improved planning alone will not be sufficient to meet the runway 
throughput requirements. It will only work when aircraft will meet the planning. In other words, 
the ATM strategy of LVNL implies a shift towards time-based operations in accordance with 
the operational concepts of NextGen and SESAR. 
 
3.3 Time-based operations in ATM 
The heart of a new envisaged ATM operation as described in SESAR [10] and NextGen [11] is 
the concept of Trajectory Based Operations. The objective is to optimize the use of airspace to 
cope with the increasing number of flights and to keep the ATM network affordable. The ATM 
system should be a performance-based, service-oriented operational concept. Stakeholders 
should improve their planning and meet their respective target times to enable a smooth 
operational process. The reference business trajectory should be a contract to what the Airspace 
User agrees to fly and the ANSP and Airport agree to facilitate. Good planning and execution of 
that planning, a time-based operation, will be key to the success of the operational concept. For 
the ANSP, a time-based operation will pose new requirements on the architecture of the ATM 
system and air traffic control procedures. The function of the controller is to maintain and 
expedite a safe and orderly flow of traffic. Improved accuracy in meeting a planning as 
produced by an AMAN system becomes a hard requirement. 
 
3.4 Support tools in time-based operations  
To improve punctuality both pilots and controllers will need automated assistance. The support 
tools that LVNL is investigating, vary from a fully ground-based trajectory prediction solution, 
the SARA tool, to an air-ground negotiated CTA at a given fix, which allows an optimal FMS 
determined route and flight parameters. 
SARA was developed to support area controllers in delivering aircraft at IAF with high 
precision (cf. less than plus or minus 30 seconds instead of plus or minus 120 seconds or less). 
SARA generates a speed and route advise that will allow the controller to give a single 
clearance to the aircraft for the whole descent.  A single clearance will decrease some aspects of 
the workload for the controller and aircrew.  It will also allow the aircrew to use the FMS in the 
descent to optimise the descent profile. The main benefit of SARA, being a ground-based tool, 
is that controllers can use it for all arriving flights. Specific aircraft equipment is not needed. 
Therefore, LVNL believes that SARA will be a useful tool for controllers that can be 
implemented reasonably soon. CTAs, as part of the SESAR concept [10], could subsequently be 
implemented. Implementation of CTAs into the operational ATM system requires Required 
Time of Arrival (RTA) technology in the FMS system of aircraft. The challenge lies in the fact 
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that various aircraft have different FMS systems on board. Some FMS do not have RTA build in 
yet, and even if they do, the operation could differ. In the CASSIS project [13], in which LVNL 
participates, some early applications of CTA have been described and tested in fast-time 
simulations.  The graduate transition from various varying SARA concepts to SARA designs 
and towards deployment of full CTAs is assumed extremely important from human factors 
perspective with SA being a central issue. 
 
3.5 SA in future time-based operations 
For the controller, the operation will gradually change from a tactical first-come-first-serve 
operation towards a more strategic time-based operation. These operations might have a large 
impact on the controller’s SA, and hence the capacity to act. However, the degree to which SA 
is affected depends on the specific operational design and task allocation between humans and 
systems. The ground-based SARA tool could help controllers to instruct the correct speed and 
route to aircraft in order to arrive at a fix on time. This might decrease the workload as, once the 
instruction is given, the controller only needs to monitor the execution of the instruction. The 
controller would only be required to give an instruction in case of a conflict 
The CTA concept takes the monitoring role a step further. The ground and airspace user agree a 
time to meet the fix. The FMS will determine the right flight profile to meet the objective; thus, 
in CTA the controller appears to be more out-of-the-loop. It also depends on the specific, more 
detailed design properties of SARA or CTA. Some specific changes of SA and possible risks 
are expected, which should be considered in the design and must be verified in real-time 
simulations. 
In both SARA and CTA, controllers will have to incorporate time as a fourth dimension in their 
mental picture in order to plan, prioritize and sequence flows, as well as to assure separation. 
This requires more anticipation and strategic thinking than nowadays. In the current way of 
working, the controllers mentally form three-dimensional patterns of aircraft on a certain 
moment of time, on which they base their decisions. Being in time at a waypoint with high 
accuracy changes the controller’s SA because more ‘thinking-in-time’ is required than they are 
used to. Currently the controllers are more ‘thinking-in-distance’ and this determines how they 
sequence the arrival traffic. Tactical control will move towards more strategic control with a 
larger planning horizon. In the CTA concept, the controllers will provide pilots with time 
constraints. This is new for both because nowadays the clearances only include speed, altitude 
and heading. As stated in ATM research on human factors in SESAR [10], more long-term 
planning could mean that certain responsibilities will move from the radar controller to the 
planner or even to the pilot in managing traffic flows in radar control. 
In addition, both SARA and CTA imply that certain tasks of controllers are moved to the 
system. Currently, controllers determine the speeds and routes for aircraft. SARA will support 
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them with achieving higher accuracy by providing speed and route advisories. In case of CTA, 
the FMS determines how flights will achieve the required time of arrival in terms of speeds and 
altitudes. Controllers might loose their feeling of control when their work moves too much 
towards supervisory control. They might experience difficulties with trusting the system when 
solutions are conflicting with their own plan and their SA might be (adversely) undermined. In 
other words, they cannot use their own strategies for traffic handling anymore. Dependent on 
the specific application of SARA and CTA, controllers could have less insight into the specific 
flight path of aircraft. This will definitely decrease their SA. Consequently, it might make it 
difficult for them to regain their SA if manual interventions are needed in case of system 
failures and other circumstances (e.g., weather) in which SARA does not work. Switching 
between these automated (routine) and manual (non-routine) operations can increase their 
workload substantially. It depends on the frequency of using conventional methods to which 
extent the controllers can be the fallback. 
Especially during transition towards the new concept, the new system might not work optimally. 
Circumstances such as traffic mix (e.g., RTA-equipped and non-equipped aircraft in CTA 
operations) or non-nominal situations (e.g., bad weather, runway changes, traffic bunches) 
might force the controllers to switch between conventional and new operational concepts. When 
such a switch is required, their mental picture will have to immediately change. This poses a 
critical demand on cognitive flexibility, raises the controller’s workload, and carries the risk of 
reduced control performance. As a result, the chance for human errors may increase. Therefore, 
this switching must be limited as much as possible and the transition to the new situation should 
be made gradual. In addition, in case of CTA, it should be clear for controllers which aircraft are 
RTA-equipped and which are not. This enhances their SA because they can easily incorporate 
this information into their mental picture. 
 
 
4 Real-time simulation Experiment  
LVNL has conducted real-time simulation (RTS) experiments with SARA but not yet with 
CTA. Therefore, the focus here is on the preliminary results of the RTS experiment, which is 
executed for two design alternatives for SARA. The expected impact on the controller SA was 
assessed, as well as the relationship between workload and SA based on the ATC Performance 
Model [8] [9] (see Figure 1).  
 
4.1 Design of SARA 
The SARA tool relies on several functions in the ATM system: Inbound Traffic Planner (or 
AMAN), Surveillance Data, and a Trajectory Predictor (TP).  The performance of these support 
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functions determines the performance of SARA.  SARA processes a flight in seven steps.  
These steps are as follows:   
 
1. The flight is activated in the ATM system and becomes part of the AMAN planning.  
2. Once the planning is considered stable, SARA starts to function.  
3. In SARA, the Expected Approach Time (EAT) is used for the flight as input. 
4. The TP is used to determine the current position of flights and planning (surveillance 
data). The TP is also used to calculate the flights Estimated Time Over (ETO) the IAF.  
For this calculation, it is assumed that the route entered into the ATM system will be the 
route flown.   
5. The EAT is compared with the ETO. If the difference is outside a set bandwidth (plus 
or minus less than 30 seconds at IAF), the process of generating advisories will be 
initiated. These advisories can consist of speed (concept 1) or a combination of speed 
and route (concept 2). 
6. An iterative process is started where the TP is used to calculate a speed or a speed and 
route combination that will bring the aircraft to the IAF such that the EAT and ETO is 
below the threshold value.   
7. Once a solution within the bandwidth is found, it is communicated to the controller.  
The SARA advice will be integrated in the HMI.  Figure 2 illustrates how speed 
advisories are displayed in the aircraft label, and EAT and delta Time (T; EAT-ETO) in 
the stacklist. 
 
 
Figure 2. The SARA HMI. 
In this process, the controller remains fully responsible for separating the traffic. SARA only 
calculates speed (concept 1) or speed and route combination (concept 2) to execute the planning 
in the most optimal way. However, SARA does not provide conflict free solutions with both 
concept 1 and 2.  This implies that controllers must deviate from advisories when they evoke 
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conflicts. In future developments of SARA or other time-based operations, a conflict detection 
and resolution step could be added to the process. In this RTS experiment, concept 1 and 
concept 2 have been evaluated providing SARA advisories to LVNL controllers only, or both to 
LVNL and Maastricht UAC (MUAC) controllers. 
 
4.2 Methods 
The SARA RTS was performed at NLR’s ATC Research SIMulator (NARSIM). The 
experiment was conducted during four days. At the first two days, eight LVNL controllers 
participated (N=8), while at the other two days four LVNL controllers and four MUAC 
controllers participated (N=2x4). Because of the length of this paper and the uniformity of the 
interpretation of the data, only the results from the first two days, with LVNL controllers, will 
be presented.  
A single simulation run involved two controllers and two pseudo-pilots working in tandem for 
Amsterdam Area Control (ACC) sector 1 and sector 2. The pseudo-pilots had radio contact with 
the controller for the specific sector. Four identical runs were executed at the same time. Each 
pair of controllers started with two training runs to get familiarized with the simulator and the 
SARA HMI. The results do not include the training runs. Next, the pairs executed four 
experimental runs. For comparison purposes, the same traffic sample was used for the four runs. 
The measured traffic sample contained 18 arrival flights. Between each run, the aircraft 
callsigns were shuffled and controllers switched working positions. Therefore, effects resulting 
from the familiarity of the controller with the traffic sample, the controllers’ familiarity with the 
traffic for a specific sector and inter-controller working strategies were minimized. 
The four experimental runs consisted of two baseline runs and two SARA runs. Run 1 mimics 
current operations and functioned as a baseline in which controllers had standard system support 
and delivered aircraft at the IAF with an accuracy of plus or minus 120 seconds or less 
compared to the EAT. Run 2 functioned as a second baseline in which controllers had a stricter 
time target similar to the SARA runs (less than plus or minus 30 seconds) and limited system 
support. The support consisted of a delta time (T; EAT – ETO) presented in the aircraft label. In 
runs 3 and 4, SARA provided respectively speed-only advisories, and speed and route 
combinations. Table 1 gives an overview: 
Table 1. Properties per run 
Run Target time over IAF System support 
1  Within plus or minus 120 sec Standard 
2 Within plus or minus 30 sec Delta T in label 
3 Within plus or minus 30 sec SARA speed 
4 Within plus or minus 30 sec SARA speed & route 
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During and after each simulation run, quantitative and qualitative data was gathered. The 
accuracy with which the controllers managed to meet the planned time over the IAF (EAT) for 
each aircraft was called ‘EAT adherence’. During the runs, the Instantaneous Self Assessment 
(ISA) was used as a subjective measure of workload and prompted the controller for their input 
every three minutes. Furthermore, workload was measured objectively by calculating the total 
number of R/T calls, the average time spent on R/T by each controller, and the number of 
instructions entered into the system through the Touch Input Devices (TID). Directly after each 
simulator run, the eight controllers were asked for their opinions on SA using an adapted 
version of the SASHA-Q questionnaire [14]. These questionnaires also contained open 
questions. Interviews were held after each run serving as a debriefing. The focus was on their 
experiences with working with SARA and its acceptability. During the runs, human factor 
observers were taking notes. The questionnaires, interviews, and observations provided 
additional qualitative results. 
 
4.3 Results 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to compare the various runs with 
each other. Partial eta-squared (ηp2) is given as a measure of effect size. Pairwise comparisons 
with Bonferroni corrections were performed where appropriate to calculate specific outcomes. 
For each analysis, an α < .05 was used. 
 
EAT adherence 
The obtained data for 18 flights in the four experimental runs, handled by four controller pairs, 
were analyzed for missing values and outliers. The results showed a significant delivery 
accuracy improvement when SARA was used, F(3,63) = 40.918, p < .001, ηp2 = .661. Figure 3 
presents the means and standard deviations for each run (it should be noticed that the graphs in 
all figures are not trend lines but the points are interconnected as a visual aid). 
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Figure 3. EAT adherence 
 
The average absolute EAT adherence improved from approximately 57 and 25 seconds 
accuracy respectively for the two baseline runs 1 and 2 to approximately 12 seconds accuracy 
for the two SARA runs 3 and 4. No significant differences were found between the two SARA 
runs (speed-only, speed and route). Interestingly, setting the target at less than 30 seconds and 
providing the controllers with limited system support (a delta T in the aircraft label) already 
significantly improved the accuracy to approximately 25 seconds.  
 
Workload 
For each run, nine ISA measurements were obtained from each of the eight controllers. An 
ANOVA on the ISA scores for the four runs showed a significant effect, F(3,68) = 17.256, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .432. Workload in run 3 and run 4 only differs much with run 2. Run 2 imposed a 
significantly higher workload on the controllers compared to the average of their ratings of the 
other runs, p < .01. Run 4 (speed and route) was rated to be as equally demanding as run 3 
(speed-only), p = .701. Figure 4 presents the means and standard deviations for each run for the 
ISA measures: 
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Figure 4. ISA measures 
Seven measurements were obtained for the total number of R/T calls for the four simulation 
runs in two sectors (one outlier was deleted). These workload measures showed a significant 
effect in the ANOVA, F(3,3) = 21.985, p < .05 ηp2 = .956. Run 4 (speed and routes) required the 
lowest number of calls; less than baseline run 2 and SARA run 3, and potentially with baseline 
run 1 (p = .067). SARA run 3 did not differ from the two baseline runs. The two baseline runs 
did not differ from each other. Figure 5 presents the means and standard deviations per run for 
the number of R/T calls: 
 
 
Figure 5. Number of R/T calls 
Eight measurements were obtained for the total time spent on R/T calls (in seconds) for the four 
simulation runs in two sectors. Significant results were found in the analysis on the time spent 
on R/T, F(3,4) = 28.951, p < .01, ηp2 = .956. The speed and route combination of SARA (run 4) 
resulted in the lowest amount of time spent on communication with the aircraft compared to the 
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other runs. The speed-only variant (run 3) resulted in less R/T than baseline run 2, but did not 
differ from the baseline run 1. No differences were found between the two baseline runs 1 and 
2. See Figure 6 for the means and standard deviations for time spent on R/T: 
 
 
Figure 6. Time spent on R/T 
Eight measurements were obtained for the number of TID inputs for the four simulation runs in 
two sectors. Significant effects were found for the number of TID inputs, F(3,4) = 11.091, p < 
.05, ηp2 = .893. The total number of instructions was the lowest for SARA run 4 compared to 
baseline run 2 and SARA run 3. A trend was visible between baseline run 1 and SARA run 4, p 
= .051. Baseline run 2 showed the highest number of inputs compared to the SARA runs and 
potentially with baseline run 1, p = .081. Figure 7 presents the means and standard deviations 
for the number of TID inputs: 
 
 
Figure 7. Number of TID inputs  
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Situation Awareness 
Questions from the adjusted SASHA-Q questionnaire were averaged to serve as a total SA score 
for each controller (N=8). Four questions were used that were applicable to both the SARA runs 
and the baseline runs. A significant reduction in SA was found in an ANOVA F(3,29) = 37.304, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .794. SARA runs 3 and 4 showed lower significance ratings compared to the two 
baseline runs 1 and 2. No significant differences were found between the two SARA runs as 
well as between the two baseline runs. Figure 8 presents the means and standard deviations of 
the SA ratings: 
 
 
Figure 8. Situation Awareness 
 
Qualitative results: the changed role of controllers 
In general, the qualitative evaluation results based on the open questions, observations and 
interviews indicated that the eight controllers were quite positive about the possibilities that 
SARA offers. The tool makes it possible to be more accurate at meeting the EAT at the IAF. 
This would be much more difficult without SARA. However, the human role of the controller is 
assumed to change when SARA is implemented. With respect to SA, the findings pointed at two 
major changes.  
First, a higher accuracy performance target for aircraft to be at the IAF (plus or minus less than 
30 seconds instead of 120 seconds) was experienced as quite different, both with and without 
SARA. The observers noticed that controllers were sequencing arriving aircraft and solving 
conflicts differently in order to achieve that aircraft would be on time. For instance, extra 
vectors were given and level separation was applied instead of lateral separation. The sequence 
of aircraft was often different from what the controllers would normally create. This changes 
controllers’ SA substantially because the time constraint gets more priority in the working 
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strategies. Controllers are used to creating solutions by use of more distance, rather than time. 
This explains why the controllers rated SA in the SARA runs lower than in the baseline runs as 
illustrated in Figure 7. Some controllers suggested that an introduction of time-based operations 
should start with forcing controllers in achieving more accuracy at IAF. As system support, only 
delta T in the label is needed and not necessarily SARA advisories. This might be useful for 
achieving a gradual transition towards the complete operational concept.  
Second, automation in the form of speed (and route) advisories was experienced as a novelty. 
This automation takes over some mental processes from the controllers. The advisories were 
sometimes different from the controllers’ own plan. For instance, speeds were proposed that 
resulted in a sequence that controllers never would choose, and some speed advises were  
‘unnatural’ such as speed changes just before IAF and speed changes of 5 knots. Controllers 
found it difficult to follow advisories that deviate from their own preferred strategy. Their own 
mental picture changes when advisories are in conflict with this, which could decrease their SA. 
Controllers said that they did not feel in complete control of the traffic and that extra effort was 
required to maintain SA. The controllers were forced to check all advisories and ignored some 
due to conflicts or other reasons. Some of them noticed that it is so natural to accept advisories 
while they should not trust SARA in all cases (e.g. conflicts). For instance, controllers remained 
in a reactive mode by waiting for the first advisory before issuing the first instructions to the 
aircraft when entering the FIR. This is in contrast with normal operations to solve conflicts as 
soon as possible, preferably directly at the FIR entry. With respect to SA, there was a difference 
between run 3 (only speed advisories) and run 4 (speed and route advisories). The controllers 
argued that while extra vectors were required to absorb delay in run 3, published route options 
in run 4 enabled a more predictable traffic flow that enhances SA. In addition, there were 
individual differences between controllers. Some of them recognized SARA advisories as 
guidance rather than a compulsory instruction.  
The controllers argued that this novelty increased their workload in the first SARA exercises. 
This explains the increasing values of the ISA measures presented in Figure 4. Controllers said 
that they spent much time on understanding what the logic of the system wanted, and they were 
often confused by the advisories of SARA which were contradicting compared to their own 
strategies. Hence, their physical activities did not change much, as supported by the objective 
workload measures presented in Figure 5 – 7, but the mental activities changed and increased. 
However, the controllers indicated also that they became used to the algorithm behind SARA. 
They started to predict which advisories SARA would produce after a few experimental 
sessions.  This implies that there was a strong learning effect over time. More experience will 
most likely also increase their SA. In addition, the controllers argued that it might be 
problematic to use two different working methods. Currently, SARA is designed to handle only 
arriving traffic for Schiphol, but not for arriving traffic for other airports or for departure traffic.  
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5 Discussion and conclusions 
In conclusion, the RTS experiment has shown that with system support of SARA a higher 
accuracy in meeting the EAT at the IAF is feasible. Even with minimal system support (delta T 
in aircraft label), the controllers were able to meet the target, but with SARA, further 
improvement in accuracy in meeting the EAT could be achieved. Differences in workload, both 
subjective and objective, were found between the various runs. The SARA runs (3 and 4) 
showed a decrease in physical activities (R/T calls, R/T time and TID inputs) compared to the 
baseline runs (1 and 2), but subjective workload was experienced as higher. The objective 
workload was lower in run 4 (speeds and routes) than in run 3 (speeds only). This is logical, 
because the SARA advisories reduce the actions required by the controller. SA was rated higher 
for run 4 than for run 3, because the published route options in combination with speed 
advisories resulted in a more predictable traffic flow. In run 3, with only speed advisories, 
controllers were forced to use unnatural vectors for achieving accuracy. However, this is 
probably also influenced by a learning effect. Given the fact that the experiment took only a few 
days, the chance that their workload would decrease after more experience in line with the 
objective workload measures is very high.  
Changes in SA can explain why subjective workload is experienced as higher in the SARA runs 
than in the baseline runs, although the objectively measured workload indicates the opposite. As 
expected from the literature, there seems to be two major influences on SA. First, more focus on 
time (higher accuracy at IAF) instead of on distance changes the controller’s three-dimensional 
mental picture. This results in a different way of sequencing arriving traffic and solving 
conflicts. Planning becomes more important. Second, increased automation by SARA advisories 
decreases the controller’s SA, especially controllers with minor experience. The system replaces 
some mental activities of the controller, that is, considering appropriate speeds (and routes). 
Consequently, the controllers cannot always apply their own preferred strategy in the traffic 
handling if they accept the advisories. These strategies are assumed crucial for current 
controllers to be able to deal with changing traffic situations and workload [6]. It might decrease 
human flexibility to switch between various situations (routine vs. non-routine) and therefore it 
requires support tools such as SARA. The findings of the RTS also provide some proof for the 
theory of the ‘out-of-the-loop’ performance problem in increased automation as described [1]. 
The controllers experienced less awareness of the situation, less feeling of control, and 
sometimes they trusted the system too much. However, in the SARA concepts evaluated in the 
RTS, the controller is still fully responsible for ignoring or accepting SARA advisories and for 
the separation between aircraft. In other words, the controller is still completely ‘in-the-loop’ 
and makes the decisions, even though SARA calculates advisable speeds (and routes) to support 
the controller. The problem of vigilance caused by too much monitoring, risking that the 
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controller cannot regain SA while he functions as the fallback, is not applicable here. 
Additionally, SA is expected to increase when controllers gain experience and can predict 
SARA advisories. This definitely will decrease their subjective workload. The only problem 
might be that controllers get used to the advisories and cannot make the calculations anymore 
when SARA cannot be applied due system failures, weather circumstances, special traffic 
situations etc. The ‘out-of-the-loop’ problem could become important in further developed time-
based operations when routes are dynamic, conflict management is automated and datalink is 
used. The controllers’ SA will decrease because there is less need to form a mental picture if the 
system manages the traffic flows. They have minor insight into the planned flight path of 
aircraft. In that case, the human cannot be the fallback anymore in case of system failure. 
Finally, it must be noted that this SARA RTS experiment has certain limitations. First, the 
experiment was restricted to a few days with involvement of only a small number of 
participants. Definitive conclusions about the changed human role of controllers in terms of SA 
and workload cannot be given yet. Second, only two SARA concepts were evaluated with just 
one HMI. Alternative SARA designs can lead to other results. For instance, the experience of 
decreasing SA might change if the information is displayed in another way. Third, measuring 
learning effects, relevant for a possibly gradual implementation of SARA, requires a longer 
period of evaluation. Therefore, the preliminary results of this experiment should be verified in 
a broader context of literature research and related experiments (e.g. in SESAR). 
 
5.1 SA requirements in time-based operations 
A set of SA requirements for the design of controller support tools such as SARA and in CTA 
in future time-based operations can be derived from the findings in the literature and from the 
preliminary results of the SARA RTS experiment. It is important that such requirements guide 
the design instead of only deriving human factor consequences when the tools have been 
technically designed already. Starting point is that the support tools for controllers must reduce 
the ATM system complexity, as stated in the LVNL ATM strategy, next to other stakeholder 
requirements for cost-effectiveness, capacity, punctuality, safety and noise reduction. Based on 
the results described in this paper a following set of ten SA requirements for time-based 
operations in ATM could be: 
 
• Achieving more accuracy in meeting the EAT requires a clear planning display for 
controllers that predicts time effects on their actions (cf. delta T) in order to support their 
SA. 
• System support must take over complex calculations from the controllers (e.g. 
appropriate speeds) for keeping the workload and SA of an acceptable level when 
achieving more accuracy with the same traffic capacity. 
• System support (e.g. speed advisories) must be so natural (cf. human-centered) that they 
can become part of the controllers’ strategies for maximizing their SA. 
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• As long as the controller is responsible for the separation between aircraft, certain 
flexibility in using the system is needed (e.g. excluding single or multiple flights from 
SARA advisories) to let the controllers follow their own strategies based on SA. 
• For constantly maintaining SA, the controller must remain active by taking his own 
decisions in the aircraft’s flight path, eventually helped by system support.  
• The right amount of information must be displayed in such a way that the controllers can 
form one integrated mental picture for maintaining their SA. 
• If the system has become a conflict manager that has taken over the controllers’ SA, the 
fallback cannot be the human anymore; the system must be fully reliable. 
• The transition towards time-based operations must be done in small steps (system 
support, procedures) to become familiarized with differences in SA. 
• A gradual implementation of time-based operations may not result in a mixture of 
working methods that increase the controllers’ workload and decrease SA. 
• In mixed traffic situations, the system must display which aircraft are equipped (e.g., with 
RTA) and which are not for supporting the controllers’ SA. 
Many SA requirements are strongly related to safety and might be addressed in a safety case, 
for instance, how reliable a fallback system must be or when the controllers´ workload is not 
acceptable anymore. 
 
5.2 Final conclusion and future directions 
In conclusion, time-based operations as planned in future ATM systems require well-designed 
support tools for controllers and a graduate implementation to compensate for the impact on 
controllers’ SA and workload. At LVNL, the SA requirements are addressed in the further 
development of SARA and CTA operations in the coming years. An operational trial with 
SARA (only speed advisories) is planned in 2009 to further develop the Trajectory Predictor of 
SARA and to evaluate the impact on controllers in the operational environment. LVNL also 
participates in the project CASSIS that investigates CTA operations within the context of the 
SESAR concept [13]. Real-time simulations and operational trials for Schiphol Airport are 
planned in this project for the next two years. All these activities must contribute to a successful 
implementation of time-based operations at Schiphol Airport. 
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